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# *Central Intelligence Bulletin*

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5 September 1967

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Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP79T00975A010300030001-3

Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP79T00975A010300030001-3

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\*Vietnam: As expected, the Thieu-Ky slate won the presidential election by a comfortable margin, but dark horse peace candidate Truong Dinh Dzu handily outdistanced leading civilian hopefuls to come in second.

According to the still unofficial final tally, Thieu and Ky received 34.8 percent of the vote. The vociferous Dzu, who had been expected to finish well down the list, garnered a surprising 17.2 percent. Tran Van Huong and Phan Khac Suu, both formerly regarded as the only contenders for second place, did poorly even in their IV Corps stronghold. Suu received 10.8 percent of the national vote and Huong, 10.0 percent.

A total of 4,868,266 voters, or 83.1 percent of those registered, went to the polls, as compared with the 80.8 percent who voted in last year's Constituent Assembly elections.

Senate election returns are incomplete and probably will not be tabulated until late today.

Although no evidence of election irregularities has come to light, several of the losers are expected to file protests charging government fraud. Dzu, evidently in a heady state over his good showing, has promised to reveal a list of irregularities at a press conference this week. Suu and Huong had earlier threatened to register official protests if Thieu and Ky won.

Demonstrations may also be in the offing. Some of the stronger civilian candidates may send their supporters into the streets. In addition, militant Buddhists and members of the Saigon Students' Union are apparently gearing up for nonviolent demonstrations in Saigon by 6 September.

The Viet Cong's widespread antielection terrorism was characterized by light mortar attacks on provincial towns and hamlets, plastic explosions, road blocks, and

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[redacted]

grenade attacks on polling stations. In the four days preceding the elections, 210 separate Viet Cong incidents took place in which 217 persons were killed, 1,094 were wounded, and 494 were abducted. Although enemy activity tapered off somewhat after midday on Sunday, harassment continued and additional casualties were reported, a large proportion of them South Vietnamese civilians.

Despite the level of violence, characterized as three to four times normal and well above last fall's pre-election terror, voting was interrupted at only a handful of polling stations. Vigorous precautionary measures by allied military and civilian officials appear to have checked planned enemy initiatives in a number of cases.

[redacted]


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India: The political situation is becoming more explosive in the densely populated and strategically important state of West Bengal.

Several areas of the state, including the vital port city of Calcutta, recently have been wracked by increased violence. The disturbances have included harassment of industrial management and college staffs, mass arson attacks, physical assaults on railway staffs and property, and street fighting. Students, trade unionists, railway passengers, and peasants resisting government rice procurement measures are all involved in the turmoil.

Militants within the ranks of the radical left Communists (CPI/L) are encouraging the violence in an effort to force the party's more moderate leadership to withdraw from the state's shaky coalition government. Some normally conservative groups have also entered the fray, fearing that if the CPI/L is not driven from office before the December harvest, it will remain in the government for years. The CPI/L moderates and the pro-Moscow Communists fear for their political future if the coalition collapses.

New Delhi is reluctant to intervene and, in the end, may not need to. The West Bengal coalition government is deeply split between the Communists--the largest element--and their more moderate partners. The capacity of the CPI/L to mobilize the public has probably also weakened because of the internal party split, an increasing challenge from the local Congress Party, and some public concern over the continuation of pointless violence. In the short run, however, the prospects for law and order are poor.


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## Soviet Extended-Range Impact Areas



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USSR: The Soviet Union announced the closure of two zones in the Pacific on 2 September and fired an SS-9 into one of them from Tyuratam the next day. The areas will be closed until 30 October. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The two closed areas can be reached by all operational Soviet ICBMs and may be used as targets for troop training firings from deployed sites. [REDACTED]

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Bolivia-Argentina-Peru: Argentina and Peru are becoming increasingly concerned over insurgency in Bolivia. Senior army officers in both countries have reportedly discussed the possibility of sending troops to help defeat the Cuban-supported guerrillas. In highly nationalistic Bolivia, however, it would be extremely difficult for President Barrientos to permit the entrance of foreign troops. Furthermore, the Bolivian Army recently succeeded in wiping out a rebel rear guard, which will militate against bringing in any foreign contingents. [REDACTED]

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
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Nigeria: Despite the insistence of Lagos that its struggle with Biafra is an internal matter and outside mediation is not welcome, there is growing African pressure to try to find a way to end the Nigerian crisis. Ghana, long interested in finding a negotiated solution to the crisis and recently alarmed by growing Soviet influence in Nigeria, has invited six states to meet in Accra to discuss the problem. Some east and central African states also will apparently try to secure general consideration of the issue at the Organization of African Unity meeting now under way in Kinshasa.

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